Prudence and Hope

Prudence and Hope

Introduction

One of the most complicated issues in international relations recently took an unusual but fascinating turn. In a relationship marred by diplomatic isolation, military engagement and a seemingly endless series of threats, the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran have not shared diplomatic relations since the 1979 revolution. Angry students with the subtle backing of Islamic clerics stormed the American embassy, long termed the “den of spies” which stood accused of supporting the unpopular regime of Shah Pahlavi. The diplomats and soldiers there were held for 444 days, threatened daily with execution and interrogation. A failed American military rescue cost the lives of eight U.S. servicemen. The anti-American and Anti-Israel rhetoric did not let up in thirty-four years and only intensified as Iran began developing nuclear technologies.

Until recently the status quo seemed likely to continue. The election of Hassan Rouhani, who ran on a platform of “prudence and hope” as president of Iran in June could mark the beginning of a change in relations. While not directed at the United States specifically, President Rouhani's September 19^th editorial in the Washington Post is an outline of Rouhani-doctrine, a declaration of detente and multilateralism. Rouhani called for “constructive engagement” and a reduction of tension and pursuance of “shared objectives.”

This is a marked turn around from the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, known for his firebrand declarations that the United States is “the Great Satan” and an imperialist power supporting Israel, which he threatened on several occasions to “wipe off the map.” Ahmadinejad was also famously known for clashing with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on matters of policy and his intrusion into cabinet appointments despite Khamenei's enthusiastic public support after Ahmadinejad was first elected.

The turn from confrontation to engagement in such a short time is dramatic and it offers opportunities for new policies and the potential for a lasting change in stabilizing a dangerous region of the globe. However, it comes with a minefield of potential problems not the least of which concerns the Iranian stance on Israel and despite Rouhani's recent charm offensive, real power rests in the hands of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, a man whose academic upbringing involved the intensive reading of Sayyid Qutb and ardent support for Sharia.

A slew of questions must be answered. What exactly has triggered this turnaround? Is it sustainable? Is it sincere? Can anything concrete result from interactions between two regional powers that have effectively not spoken to each other in 34 years? Israel has rarely been known to be a passive observer, how will they react?

Background

Iran is unique in that it is one of the few majority Shia Muslim countries along with Iraq and Azerbaijan. It is also a complicated country, home of some of the world's oldest civilizations, and greatest empires, but also supportive of religious persecution, human rights violations and monetary support of terrorist organizations, not to mention the development of nuclear technologies believed key in construction of weapons. It was recognized as being part of an “Axis of Evil” by the Bush administration for those reasons. Despite being lumped together with Iraq and North Korea, Iran shares few similarities or good will together either nation. Iran and Iraq fought a brutal war against one another when Saddam Hussein believed the new Islamic Republic of Iran weak in 1980 and attempted to secure Baghdad as the leader of the Middle East. Additionally Iran would have little good will for the largely atheist North Korea, a state whose population worships the ruling family.

Although Iran's people do vote in elections, affording them some limited democracy, all power in the country is held by the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. He has seen four different presidents during his time as Supreme Leader, swaying between the more moderate Katami and the firebrand Ahmadinejad and, yet, Iranian foreign policy towards the West and the United States in particular has not changed considerably, indicating it is still in the hands of Khamenei and not subject to the changing agendas of elected Iranian presidents.

Khamenei himself is an interesting figure, at times seemingly torn between two ideologies, a contradiction in beliefs. On one hand, he was a studier of Sayyid Qutb, a firm believer in the establishment of an Islamic state, even translating his works into Persian after Qutb was executed by the secular Egyptian dictatorship of Abdul Nasser Qutb's work would be alleged to influence Osama bin Laden and other Islamic radicals.

In his younger years, Khamenei saw the overthrow of the democratically elected government of Mohammad Mosaddeq by the Eisenhower administration. This planted in Khamenei a fear of repeated American interference in Iranian affairs. He would later be elected as president during the 1980s war with Iraq which had been receiving aid from the United States. These events had a profound impact of Khamenei's views. His 1987 address to the United Nations indicated a profound distrust of American foreign policy, and criticism of its involvement in the overthrow of Mosaddeq, the oppression under Shah Pahlavi and economic embargoes.

These fears and beliefs would influence his policies as Supreme Leader. He seems to fear continued American interference in Iranian affairs and interest in regime change in countries intending to use them as proxies or buffers against the Soviet Union. For Khamenei these were forms of imperialism and Iran was the victim. He seemed to be echoing Qutb's arguments that Islam provided a counter to both capitalist and communist imperialism, encouraging an Islamic state free of the conflict offered by both Cold War ideologies that stood united and independent. He often presented Iran as the victim of international imperialism and took great pride whenever Iran was able to rebuke a foreign power.

Khamenei would also harbor a certain suspicion of the United States and United Nations by observing the fates of his neighbors. Both Iraq and Libya had been opened to nuclear inspectors and both regimes ended up falling to American invasions or supported rebellions. He has also witnessed North Korea, refusing to give in to American and U.N. demands regarding its nuclear weapons program and continued to develop and test weapons. Iran has also kept a careful eye on Israel, long seen as an American puppet state, as it developed a nuclear weapons program and the hypocritical reactions to its program and the Iranian program. Khamenei seems to have few reasons to trust the United States.

Change

The question remains then, why the sudden change in policy and willingness to engage the former “Great Satan” in constructive dialogue? There are several possible reasons for this.

What seems likely is that the layers of sanctions placed on Iran have been effective. Prices have risen dramatically for every day goods including medicine. The Iranian public may be seeking a lifting of those sanctions. If indeed the government is constructing nuclear weapons, the Iranian people may not see the results as worth the problems presented by the sanctions. Rouhani presented a platform by which he could open lines of communication with the United States, the primary instigator of those sanctions. The election results may be an indicator of a population tired of international isolation and economic sanctions.

Additionally, as sanctions tighten and Iran continues to declare itself in support of the presidency of Bashar al-Assad, it becomes increasingly isolated politically. This is contrary to Iran's foreign policy goals. The killing of Muslims by other Muslims is generally forbidden in Islam, so Khamenei loses influence among Islamic hardliners by supporting a regime that is actively doing just that. Al-Assad is largely a secular leader, so support for a state that does not actively consider itself Islamic and follow Sharia law again erodes support Khamenei counts on amongst the Islamic scholars and clerics that make up his councils.

The Arab Spring movement, or the Islamic Awakening movement as Khamenei has taken to calling it, presents new opportunities for Iran to guide new governments (many of whom contain leaders from the Muslim Brotherhood – Qutb's former organization). It becomes more difficult for Iran to be shown as a role model for potential Islamic states when it has trouble caring for its own population in the face of international isolation. Sacrificing a nuclear weapons program for leadership of an Islamic Middle East may be a worthwhile trade.

It is worth pointing out that all presidential candidates must be approved by the a council of ruling clerics including Khamenei. It is not impossible to see his hand in clearing a path for Rouhani's victory and his support for engagement. It may be politically difficult for Khamenei to openly call for engagement himself, in which case he would need to rely on more clandestine signaling. When states do not have clear lines of communications, both leaders must make use of signaling, through either intermediaries like mutual friendly nations or the U.N. or the press, in order to pass messages. It seems possible that Rouhani might be Khamenei's agent. In December of 2007, the Supreme Leader claimed that he would not sever relations with any state forever, indicating he would be open to negotiations with the United States and would be first to do so if he believed it beneficial to Iran.

It seems then, that Khamenei might have an agent capable of carrying out his will. We have known that Khamenei has had a hand in rigging election results before, so one can wonder if he had a hand in Rouhani as well. It is possible that Khamenei is signaling to American policy makers that he is ready to think about a change in relations. Rouhani ran on a successful platform of “prudence and hope” a slogan quite similar to Barrack Obama's 2008 campaign. It is possible that Rouhani tapped into a similar feeling amongst Iranian voters as Obama found with Americans. It is worth noting that “prudence” is not the same as “change.” It implies a more cautious, carefully considered approach rather than the aggressive one Rouhani has been pushing. Such sudden and rapid turnarounds rarely occur so suddenly; barely a week had passed between Rouhani's editorial and his phone call with Obama.

Rouhani himself may be in a good position to begin to change relations between the two states. He served as the Head of the Department of Defense in the years Khamenei was president during the Iran-Iraq War, demonstrating a positive working relationship between the two. Rouhani also severed as the chief negotiator of Iran's nuclear program working to decrease tensions and prevent what seemed to be a looming international confrontation. His name, then, is not unfamiliar to Western leaders.

His popular mandate for easing tensions and apparent eagerness to open communications with the United States has the support of the Iranian people, insofar that Khamenei's hand in the election results was not extensive. The Iranian people, feeling the pinch of American sanctions, may be willing to go to the negotiating table before Khamenei. Obviously, there is a segment of the Iranian population that was unhappy with Ahmadinejad and Khamenei demonstrated in the Green Movement protests.

Rouhani comes with his own problems as well. One of the conditions the United States typically requires for negotiations with belligerent Islamic states is the recognition of Israel's right to statehood, something successive Iranian leaders have refused to do. Even recognizing the Holocaust has been an unacceptable platform for Iran. A recent interview claimed that Rouhani accepted that the Holocaust occurred, though a reanalysis of the interview indicated a mistranslation and a more neutral response that was more in line with the traditional views of Rouhani, Kahemenei and Iran towards Israel and Jews in general. It seems as though any negotiations between the United States and Iran would need to address the issue of Israel. The cooling of Iran's rhetoric towards Israel might be too much for Khamenei and Rouhani to accept. Indeed, a recent Republican-sponsored bill in the American Senate sets two preconditions for discussions between Obama and Iran: the release of American Christians in Iranian jails and the recognition of Israel as state. The latter of which seems extremely unlikely and indicates hesitance on both sides.

That didn't stop Obama and Rouhani from speaking for almost fifteen minutes in a phone call. The contents of that call were not made public but it was reportedly “productive.” It does not require a stretch of the imagination that little of any real substance was discussed. It was, however, the first real diplomatic contact between the leaders of either state for over thirty years.

Difficult situations at home present both leaders with opportunities. Obama's Republican controlled congress and the power of hardliners in Iran make the breaking off of communications easy should either leader get cold feet. Throughout this process, both leaders will need to keep means of cutting off communications if the situation appears too threatening.

Potential Policy

What can begin here is a new dialogue between centrist leaders with an eye towards the future and potentially alter the balance of power in the Middle East. It is important to remember that Iran's intentions here are not entirely altruistic. Like any other state, Iran has an agenda and understanding its motivations are key to interacting with its leadership successfully and without harm to the United States.

Iran is likely attempting to reestablish itself as a regional power. The failure of its ally, Syria, to abide by Islamic teachings and also to remain a stable and worthwhile friend, seems to be a partially motivating factor. Perhaps Khamenei has come to understand that Iran is not going to be successful if it only considers hard power in the form of nuclear weapons and firebrand allies. Successful engagement with the United States and liberal democracies in general can come about through soft power methods as well.

The response of the world to Syria's use of chemical weapons actually serves as a litmus test for Iranian leaders. What if Iran developed and used nuclear weapons? The immediate aggressive response from the United States and U.N. Security Council resolution to strip Syria of its chemical weapon supply serves as a possible indicator of any future Iranian declaration of possession or use of nuclear weapons. It is possible, Khamenei is seeing the continued pursuit of nuclear weapons as being not worth the effort.

Furthermore, Iran seeks to end its isolation. In the response to Syria's use of chemical weapons, Russia presented a diplomatic solution rather than a military solution that resulted in Syria turning over its chemical weapon stockpiles to international actors. This indicates that Russia seems to be more influential in Middle Eastern affairs than Iran. It is somewhat damaging to Iran's desire to be a regional power if non-Muslim foreign states are solving crises in its own backyard.

Iran offering an olive branch to the United States is not one that should be ignored. To do so casts the United States as unwilling to speak with other states, especially after being rebuked internationally by attempting to spearhead another military campaign in another Muslim state. Further discussions, initially innocuous, will further plant the seeds of potential trust.

In a world where even a handshake in a hallway is politically dangerous, the initial steps must be carefully choreographed and both sides need a domestic out, should either become nervous or feel threatened. Upon returning to Tehran, protestors reportedly threw shoes at Rouhani, a grave insult in Islamic cultures. This indicates that not everyone is entirely on board with the potential of relations. It seems that many anti-Iranian elements in the United States are temporarily distracted by the impending government shutdown and that addressing the Iran issue at this time would divide attention from their domestic agenda.

Continuing forward, Iran has made the first steps in opening communication and normalizing relations. The United States is obligated, unofficially of course, to respond publicly with a counter offer. Refusing to engage now would set back relations with Iran for decades but how to proceed and at what speed remain up for debate.

First, we must determine if Iran's olive branch is legitimate and sincere. Rouhani seems to have the support of Khamenei and, thus far, has avoided any official condemnation of his actions by Khamenei. It seems to have passed the legitimacy test for now. Sincerity is difficult to determine. Unfortunately, sincerity would take time to judge and the United States would be wise to approach cautiously but optimistically, keeping disengagement options available.

The United States has many reasons to find normalizing relations productive. First, as other traditional dictatorships fall, Iran is making a bid to be a regional power. Certain responsibilities accompany this territory, specifically renouncing ties to terror groups and being forward and honest about nuclear ambitions. Both outcomes are beneficial to the United States.

Additionally, the open relations allows the United States access to certain strata in Iranian society, particularly the Green Movement individuals who protested in 2009 ahead of a government crackdown. It also opens Iran to American business and American markets which forces Iran to at least play in the more familiar ground of American capitalism. American businesses would take root in Iran and offer more potential inroads for American policy and influence in Iranian society and government.

Furthermore, it brings an enemy closer. It is much easier for American intelligence agencies to keep a closer eye on Iran and its agenda if relations between the two countries were more normal. American refusals to associate with North Korea has resulted in American intelligence agencies to be unsure exactly of Kim Jong-Un's age. The level of information flowing between the countries only improves the United States' ability to observe and analyze emerging trends and agendas.

The major issue, of course, is Israel. Iran, if it indeed intends to become a regional power, needs to behave like one, which means encouraging stability. Bellicose rhetoric directed at Israel or any nation does not result in international confidence in Iran's ability to be a leader. Israel, on the other hand, likely considers any contact between the United States and Iran that results in normalizing relations negatively. Israel wants, and expects, absolute American support, including supporting its foreign policy towards Iran. This doesn't mean that normalizing relations between Israel and Iran is impossible, even Khamenei indicated he would not close off relations with any nation forever and he did not immediately exclude Israel either.

Perhaps then, the best response the United States can offer is one Rouhani is familiar with: prudence and hope. American policymakers should be aware that Iran does indeed have an agenda, and though Rouhani's words are encouraging, it will take time for trust to develop between Obama and Rouhani, both of whom will be partially constrained by the interests of domestic actors. The initial steps must be small and cautious and all countries involved must have an escape route, should the situation return to the status quo. If those conditions can be met, then both nations have an opportunity to reinvigorate relations and possibly bring about some hope for stability in the Middle East.

A Change in Strategy

A Change in Strategy

Introduction

The recent attack in Kenya, though alarming and attracting considerable attention from American and World news networks, is not surprising. The most recent reports indicate nearly seventy people killed, and another thirty held hostage by an estimated dozen gunmen and possibly, gunwoman. Additionally, it would appear as though at least some of the gunmen are Americans and Europeans. Al Shabab, a designated terrorist group from Somalia has claimed responsibility, going so far as to releasing the names of the gunmen along with regular updates on its Twitter feed.

Kenya, a predominantly Christian nation set aside the predominantly Muslim Somalia, has been deeply concerned about the possibility of spillover violence in the aftermath of the Somali civil war and resulting instability. In 2011, Kenya, supporting the Somali military, drove al Shabab from its last stronghold in Kismayo. However, Kenya was hardly the first example of foreign intervention in Somalia, though it is the most recent. Much of al Shabab's agenda stems from resistance to armed intervention in the country and what it deems as Christian crusading and it has responded with revenge attacks.

Before we can understand the situation in Kenya, we must have some background an al Shabab and their motivations.

Background

Contrary to popular belief, al Qaida did not have a considerable foothold in Somalia either during the civil war or the Black Hawk Down firefight. Although there is evidence that al Qaida may have been involved with some training of the militias in Mogadishu, none could certainly be considered al Qaida affiliated. Certainly the network was looking for ways to enter the East African region but the constant civil war and oppressive rule by mostly secular warlords did not give al Qaida the sort of market they needed for recruits or resources. Conflicts there were largely tribal in nature and were limited in scope to the national level. The concept of global jihad was not one warlords or tribal leaders were concerned with when chaos reigned at home.

That would soon change. Even after the United States withdrew special operations forces after the perceived disaster in Mogadishu in which deceased American operators were mutilated and dragged through the streets, the CIA was still involved in the conflict. Of particular interest was Mohamed Afrah Qanyare, one of the most powerful warlords to emerge after the fall of Mohammed Diad Barre's government. The CIA partnered with him and others hunting for high value targets in Somalia with the understanding that it would be Qanyare's fighters, rather than American operators, who would do the actual takedowns. However, Qanyare's fighters ended up targeting civilians including imams and teachers which infuriated local tribes.

Those local tribes, disgusted with the loss of life, particularly the deaths of Muslims at the hands of warlords, banded together in an organization called the Islamic Courts Union. This was a loose federation of local groups interested in ending the fighting and establishing Sharia law in the country. Ultimately, Qanyare and his allies lost ground to the ICU and its collection of fighters. Harakat al Shabab al Mujahideen was one of the small groups that joined the ICU to fight Qanyare.

The exact date of al Shabab's formation seems in dispute. However, it is generally accepted that its founders were active in militant Islam in the years after the U.S. Embassy bombings in Africa but did not coalesce into a functional group until 2003, after the U.S. Invasion of Iraq. Al Shabab is Arabic for “The Youth” and much of its early history involved training young men for jihad. It was led by veteran jihadists Aden Hashi Farah Ayro and later by Ahmed Abdi Godane.

The group did not really become loosely affiliated with al Qaida until 2004 when it was joined by Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, long believed to be the mastermind behind the 1998 embassy bombings. In al Shabab, al Qaida saw a way to gain entrance into East Africa. Such relations with al Qaida were not publicly formalized until February 2012, after the death of Osama bin Laden who had feared such public confirmation would damage al Shabab's recruitment and fund raising.

As the ICU continued to push out Qanyare, it established a new government in Mogadishu under the leadership of Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. This loss did not sit well with the United States, and immediately the CIA began negotiating with Ethiopian authorities to launch an invasion in order to push out the ICU and establish the more familiar government under Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi. Ethiopia, fearing spillover violence and desiring revenge for a brutal war between the two nations in the 1970s, was eager to comply.

It was during this time that al Shabab's influence began to increase. The CIA was worried about al Shabab's militant, Islamic leanings and funded means to destroy them. The more the CIA funded those means, the more al Shabab and the ICU grew in power. The frameworks they had adopted from al Qaida influences painting the United States, Ethiopia and other nations as Christian crusaders seemed to be coming true. First American backed warlords and now American funded and supported invasions seemed to be the norm. Al Shabab retreated under the invasion, but was not finished.

The group took in tens of millions of dollars annually via its control over ports, shipping and drug and weapons smuggling. The American support of warlords and invasions fueled and inadvertently led to the development of al Shabab by supplying recruits with reasons to fight. Al Shabab took on the goal of defending Muslim land from foreign aggression, much as Mujahedin forces had in Afghanistan against the Soviets, then the Americans.

In 2011, the United States similarly supported and trained Kenyan forces which launched multiple attacks against al Shabab seeking to establish a buffer zone and prevent incursions into Kenya. Nairobi had already been the target of the bombings in 1998 which succeeded in killing nearly 200 Kenyans. Additional attacks targeted African Union facilities and Kenyan government posts.

An attack on Kenya, and on Westerners and Christians in particular, seemed to be coming. Although Kenyan authorities claim to have disrupted other plots in the past, the change in tactics and personnel might offer a reason as to why this operation was not foiled.

Recruiting Westerners

Al Shabab is unique among Islamic militant groups. A report by the House Committee on Homeland Security suggested that more Americans have ended up fighting with them than any other group. One of the first was Omar Hammami, a college student from Alabama who converted to Islam in high school and was determined to join the jihad. Hammami, also called Abu Mansor al-Amriki, was used extensively in recruiting videos and internet postings. Al Shabab also seems to be very adept at using technology to reach its target audiences which may explain its success in recruiting foreigners, especially Westerners. The group's Twitter account also seemed to be giving regular updates during the attack on the mall in Kenya.

The House Committee report also suggests at least forty Americans have joined al Shabab, over half from a Somali community in Minnesota. An FBI report from 2007 suggests that at least seven have been killed and more recent reports indicate as many as fifteen, half of whom were suicide bombers. Omar Hammami himself was reportedly killed by al Shabab after a disagreement in policy and subsequent falling out.

Reports that some of the gunmen, including possibly a gunwoman, are “white” suggest al Shabab is sending a message announcing it is intending to be more of a global player despite its reduced capabilities. In fact, it seems the vast majority of the gunmen seem to be foreigners from Western states.

The Westgate Attack

According to officials, between ten and fifteen armed gunmen, and by some accounts, gunwoman, stormed the Westgate Mall, hunting non-Muslims with a particular interest in Westerners. The attackers carefully ensured Muslims would not by harmed, apparently by asking individuals the name of Mohammad's mother. Those who identified her correctly were escorted from the building, those who failed were shot.

Evidently, the gunmen were following a stricter “rules of engagement” set forth by Ayman al Zawahiri who has taken control of al Qaida and ostensibly the global network of affiliates including al Shabab after the death of bin Laden. Zawahiri indicated attacks should only be carried out against Western or pro-Western governments not against Muslim states. Hostages were encouraged to be traded for captured militants, and that gunmen should limit or prevent the killings of innocent Muslims. Zawahiri had also evidently warned al Shabab several years ago against continued attacks in Mogadishu that resulted in the deaths of Muslims. This suggests that perhaps al Qaida's image has been damaged due to its use of force against Muslim civilians. It is also possible the recent Arab Spring movement, and civil wars in Libya and Syria and ongoing violence in Egypt that have pitted Muslims against each other may factor in to Zawahiri's thinking. It may be an effort on the part of Zawahiri to refocus militant groups on fighting the West rather than each other.

The Westgate attack is bold, considering that the majority of al Shabab's attacks in the past have been bombings, including the bombing at the Ugandan capital of Kampala that killed nearly seventy people watching the World Cup. Other suicide bombings have become al Shabab's calling card. Thus, sending a dozen gunmen into a mall without a clear exit plan is a deviation from the norm, suggesting a return in thinking to the Mumbai attacks of 2008 executed by the group Lashkar-e-Taiba. That attack resulted in the deaths of 166 people and nine of the ten gunmen. A change in tactics to the Mumbai style suggests a more organized, committed, and trained al Shabab, who look for quality, intelligent recruits, rather than simple suicide bombers.

The situation in the mall is ongoing, so no concrete conclusions can yet be made. Reports indicate that most of the hostages have been freed and that Kenyan authorities are largely operating on their own, although there is some indication that American and Israeli officials and support staff are on site.

Indicators

The attack is significant, of course, in terms of its audacity and the number of people killed. However, there are some important indicators. The fact that the gunmen went through such trouble separating out Muslims from intended targets suggests some sort of adjustment to a “rules of engagement.” Bombs are, inherently, indiscriminate, and the use of informed and capable gunmen carrying out those rules indicates a change in strategy.

It is possible that increased violence in the Muslim world has necessitated a change in approach for al Qaida and its affiliates. Indiscriminate killings of Muslims seemed to be tolerated and in some cases even encouraged by al Qaida operations, mainly via the use of suicide bombings executed by recruit recruits and converts. It suggests the civil wars in Libya, and Syria and the political violence in Egypt has taken its toll on the militant psyche. They would allege that Muslims have become distracted by secular wars against each other, when they should be united in jihad against the West. A change in strategy that prevented Muslim fatalities could be a means of encouraging Muslims to cease internal conflicts. It suggests that perhaps the fighting in Syria, including the use of gas against Muslim civilians has al Qaida concerned and looking to regain control of the situation.

Furthermore, the use of Western raised and education personnel, rather than exclusively locally recruited fighters suggests a change in thinking. Al Shabab has made no secret of its success at recruiting foreigners and the use of them as ground fighters suggests that this attack may be a test run for future plots. Using fighters with ethnic backgrounds not typical of the average al Shabab member may make it easier for them to infiltrate foreign areas more easily. Dressing and speaking as natives in the United States or Europe makes al Shabab members harder to detect.

The availability of technology to al Shabab is also worthy of consideration. Their use of internet sources, including Twitter, make recruiting of individuals in high technology areas much easier. The dissemination of information and material is simple across those sources. The Twitter account used by al Shabab was active throughout the Westgate attack until shut down by the company. Considering Somalia is one of the poorest nations on Earth and has one of the lowest percentages of its population capable of accessing the internet, al Shabab's reliance on it is interesting. It suggests foreign help.

Policy Considerations

Naturally American media and local policy agencies will worry about the security of American malls. In recent mass shootings, lone gunmen have been able to kill a dozen or more individuals in high population, low security areas such as movie theaters and schools. A dozen trained and well armed shooters could cause considerable damage.

Any attack requires resources: committed, trained and discipline personnel, access to weapons, and evasion of security. Reports from Westgate indicate at least eight of the gunmen are from Western countries. Their knowledge of American malls and American upbringing may make them ideal personnel to carry out similar attacks. Firearms in the United States are easy to obtain. Background checks routinely fail to detect those with mental illness and stealing weapons or purchasing them from a black market is not difficult.

Well known militants can be caught by INS and other homeland security agencies, therefore sending recruits from Somali or other hotspots becomes more difficult. Recruiting locally allows groups like al Shabab to bypass traditional security methods and having personnel in place without needing to send them from abroad. Al Shabab has proven very effective at this.

Considering al Shabab's primary recruiting methods are technological, this becomes a greater issue for cyber defense and local authorities. Message boards, websites and social media are often used as recruiting tools and monitoring those media are obvious means of preventing radicalization and recruitment.

Additionally, human intelligence is often the best defense. Inroads to the Somali communities, particularly in Minnesota, and local Islamic leaders can result in improve communication. American Muslims should be made to feel confident and safe when contacting local authorities with tips or concerns.

Of course, governments are not always successful in preventing terrorism. In those cases, the American public and first responders end up being the last line of defense. Many plots have been foiled, not by the CIA or military personnel, but by average citizens who were observant and responsive. A well informed citizenry, and a well trained and coordinated local response may very well be the most effective method of preventing these sorts of attacks.