Prudence and Hope

Prudence and Hope

Introduction

One of the most complicated issues in international relations recently took an unusual but fascinating turn. In a relationship marred by diplomatic isolation, military engagement and a seemingly endless series of threats, the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran have not shared diplomatic relations since the 1979 revolution. Angry students with the subtle backing of Islamic clerics stormed the American embassy, long termed the “den of spies” which stood accused of supporting the unpopular regime of Shah Pahlavi. The diplomats and soldiers there were held for 444 days, threatened daily with execution and interrogation. A failed American military rescue cost the lives of eight U.S. servicemen. The anti-American and Anti-Israel rhetoric did not let up in thirty-four years and only intensified as Iran began developing nuclear technologies.

Until recently the status quo seemed likely to continue. The election of Hassan Rouhani, who ran on a platform of “prudence and hope” as president of Iran in June could mark the beginning of a change in relations. While not directed at the United States specifically, President Rouhani's September 19^th editorial in the Washington Post is an outline of Rouhani-doctrine, a declaration of detente and multilateralism. Rouhani called for “constructive engagement” and a reduction of tension and pursuance of “shared objectives.”

This is a marked turn around from the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, known for his firebrand declarations that the United States is “the Great Satan” and an imperialist power supporting Israel, which he threatened on several occasions to “wipe off the map.” Ahmadinejad was also famously known for clashing with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on matters of policy and his intrusion into cabinet appointments despite Khamenei's enthusiastic public support after Ahmadinejad was first elected.

The turn from confrontation to engagement in such a short time is dramatic and it offers opportunities for new policies and the potential for a lasting change in stabilizing a dangerous region of the globe. However, it comes with a minefield of potential problems not the least of which concerns the Iranian stance on Israel and despite Rouhani's recent charm offensive, real power rests in the hands of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, a man whose academic upbringing involved the intensive reading of Sayyid Qutb and ardent support for Sharia.

A slew of questions must be answered. What exactly has triggered this turnaround? Is it sustainable? Is it sincere? Can anything concrete result from interactions between two regional powers that have effectively not spoken to each other in 34 years? Israel has rarely been known to be a passive observer, how will they react?

Background

Iran is unique in that it is one of the few majority Shia Muslim countries along with Iraq and Azerbaijan. It is also a complicated country, home of some of the world's oldest civilizations, and greatest empires, but also supportive of religious persecution, human rights violations and monetary support of terrorist organizations, not to mention the development of nuclear technologies believed key in construction of weapons. It was recognized as being part of an “Axis of Evil” by the Bush administration for those reasons. Despite being lumped together with Iraq and North Korea, Iran shares few similarities or good will together either nation. Iran and Iraq fought a brutal war against one another when Saddam Hussein believed the new Islamic Republic of Iran weak in 1980 and attempted to secure Baghdad as the leader of the Middle East. Additionally Iran would have little good will for the largely atheist North Korea, a state whose population worships the ruling family.

Although Iran's people do vote in elections, affording them some limited democracy, all power in the country is held by the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. He has seen four different presidents during his time as Supreme Leader, swaying between the more moderate Katami and the firebrand Ahmadinejad and, yet, Iranian foreign policy towards the West and the United States in particular has not changed considerably, indicating it is still in the hands of Khamenei and not subject to the changing agendas of elected Iranian presidents.

Khamenei himself is an interesting figure, at times seemingly torn between two ideologies, a contradiction in beliefs. On one hand, he was a studier of Sayyid Qutb, a firm believer in the establishment of an Islamic state, even translating his works into Persian after Qutb was executed by the secular Egyptian dictatorship of Abdul Nasser Qutb's work would be alleged to influence Osama bin Laden and other Islamic radicals.

In his younger years, Khamenei saw the overthrow of the democratically elected government of Mohammad Mosaddeq by the Eisenhower administration. This planted in Khamenei a fear of repeated American interference in Iranian affairs. He would later be elected as president during the 1980s war with Iraq which had been receiving aid from the United States. These events had a profound impact of Khamenei's views. His 1987 address to the United Nations indicated a profound distrust of American foreign policy, and criticism of its involvement in the overthrow of Mosaddeq, the oppression under Shah Pahlavi and economic embargoes.

These fears and beliefs would influence his policies as Supreme Leader. He seems to fear continued American interference in Iranian affairs and interest in regime change in countries intending to use them as proxies or buffers against the Soviet Union. For Khamenei these were forms of imperialism and Iran was the victim. He seemed to be echoing Qutb's arguments that Islam provided a counter to both capitalist and communist imperialism, encouraging an Islamic state free of the conflict offered by both Cold War ideologies that stood united and independent. He often presented Iran as the victim of international imperialism and took great pride whenever Iran was able to rebuke a foreign power.

Khamenei would also harbor a certain suspicion of the United States and United Nations by observing the fates of his neighbors. Both Iraq and Libya had been opened to nuclear inspectors and both regimes ended up falling to American invasions or supported rebellions. He has also witnessed North Korea, refusing to give in to American and U.N. demands regarding its nuclear weapons program and continued to develop and test weapons. Iran has also kept a careful eye on Israel, long seen as an American puppet state, as it developed a nuclear weapons program and the hypocritical reactions to its program and the Iranian program. Khamenei seems to have few reasons to trust the United States.

Change

The question remains then, why the sudden change in policy and willingness to engage the former “Great Satan” in constructive dialogue? There are several possible reasons for this.

What seems likely is that the layers of sanctions placed on Iran have been effective. Prices have risen dramatically for every day goods including medicine. The Iranian public may be seeking a lifting of those sanctions. If indeed the government is constructing nuclear weapons, the Iranian people may not see the results as worth the problems presented by the sanctions. Rouhani presented a platform by which he could open lines of communication with the United States, the primary instigator of those sanctions. The election results may be an indicator of a population tired of international isolation and economic sanctions.

Additionally, as sanctions tighten and Iran continues to declare itself in support of the presidency of Bashar al-Assad, it becomes increasingly isolated politically. This is contrary to Iran's foreign policy goals. The killing of Muslims by other Muslims is generally forbidden in Islam, so Khamenei loses influence among Islamic hardliners by supporting a regime that is actively doing just that. Al-Assad is largely a secular leader, so support for a state that does not actively consider itself Islamic and follow Sharia law again erodes support Khamenei counts on amongst the Islamic scholars and clerics that make up his councils.

The Arab Spring movement, or the Islamic Awakening movement as Khamenei has taken to calling it, presents new opportunities for Iran to guide new governments (many of whom contain leaders from the Muslim Brotherhood – Qutb's former organization). It becomes more difficult for Iran to be shown as a role model for potential Islamic states when it has trouble caring for its own population in the face of international isolation. Sacrificing a nuclear weapons program for leadership of an Islamic Middle East may be a worthwhile trade.

It is worth pointing out that all presidential candidates must be approved by the a council of ruling clerics including Khamenei. It is not impossible to see his hand in clearing a path for Rouhani's victory and his support for engagement. It may be politically difficult for Khamenei to openly call for engagement himself, in which case he would need to rely on more clandestine signaling. When states do not have clear lines of communications, both leaders must make use of signaling, through either intermediaries like mutual friendly nations or the U.N. or the press, in order to pass messages. It seems possible that Rouhani might be Khamenei's agent. In December of 2007, the Supreme Leader claimed that he would not sever relations with any state forever, indicating he would be open to negotiations with the United States and would be first to do so if he believed it beneficial to Iran.

It seems then, that Khamenei might have an agent capable of carrying out his will. We have known that Khamenei has had a hand in rigging election results before, so one can wonder if he had a hand in Rouhani as well. It is possible that Khamenei is signaling to American policy makers that he is ready to think about a change in relations. Rouhani ran on a successful platform of “prudence and hope” a slogan quite similar to Barrack Obama's 2008 campaign. It is possible that Rouhani tapped into a similar feeling amongst Iranian voters as Obama found with Americans. It is worth noting that “prudence” is not the same as “change.” It implies a more cautious, carefully considered approach rather than the aggressive one Rouhani has been pushing. Such sudden and rapid turnarounds rarely occur so suddenly; barely a week had passed between Rouhani's editorial and his phone call with Obama.

Rouhani himself may be in a good position to begin to change relations between the two states. He served as the Head of the Department of Defense in the years Khamenei was president during the Iran-Iraq War, demonstrating a positive working relationship between the two. Rouhani also severed as the chief negotiator of Iran's nuclear program working to decrease tensions and prevent what seemed to be a looming international confrontation. His name, then, is not unfamiliar to Western leaders.

His popular mandate for easing tensions and apparent eagerness to open communications with the United States has the support of the Iranian people, insofar that Khamenei's hand in the election results was not extensive. The Iranian people, feeling the pinch of American sanctions, may be willing to go to the negotiating table before Khamenei. Obviously, there is a segment of the Iranian population that was unhappy with Ahmadinejad and Khamenei demonstrated in the Green Movement protests.

Rouhani comes with his own problems as well. One of the conditions the United States typically requires for negotiations with belligerent Islamic states is the recognition of Israel's right to statehood, something successive Iranian leaders have refused to do. Even recognizing the Holocaust has been an unacceptable platform for Iran. A recent interview claimed that Rouhani accepted that the Holocaust occurred, though a reanalysis of the interview indicated a mistranslation and a more neutral response that was more in line with the traditional views of Rouhani, Kahemenei and Iran towards Israel and Jews in general. It seems as though any negotiations between the United States and Iran would need to address the issue of Israel. The cooling of Iran's rhetoric towards Israel might be too much for Khamenei and Rouhani to accept. Indeed, a recent Republican-sponsored bill in the American Senate sets two preconditions for discussions between Obama and Iran: the release of American Christians in Iranian jails and the recognition of Israel as state. The latter of which seems extremely unlikely and indicates hesitance on both sides.

That didn't stop Obama and Rouhani from speaking for almost fifteen minutes in a phone call. The contents of that call were not made public but it was reportedly “productive.” It does not require a stretch of the imagination that little of any real substance was discussed. It was, however, the first real diplomatic contact between the leaders of either state for over thirty years.

Difficult situations at home present both leaders with opportunities. Obama's Republican controlled congress and the power of hardliners in Iran make the breaking off of communications easy should either leader get cold feet. Throughout this process, both leaders will need to keep means of cutting off communications if the situation appears too threatening.

Potential Policy

What can begin here is a new dialogue between centrist leaders with an eye towards the future and potentially alter the balance of power in the Middle East. It is important to remember that Iran's intentions here are not entirely altruistic. Like any other state, Iran has an agenda and understanding its motivations are key to interacting with its leadership successfully and without harm to the United States.

Iran is likely attempting to reestablish itself as a regional power. The failure of its ally, Syria, to abide by Islamic teachings and also to remain a stable and worthwhile friend, seems to be a partially motivating factor. Perhaps Khamenei has come to understand that Iran is not going to be successful if it only considers hard power in the form of nuclear weapons and firebrand allies. Successful engagement with the United States and liberal democracies in general can come about through soft power methods as well.

The response of the world to Syria's use of chemical weapons actually serves as a litmus test for Iranian leaders. What if Iran developed and used nuclear weapons? The immediate aggressive response from the United States and U.N. Security Council resolution to strip Syria of its chemical weapon supply serves as a possible indicator of any future Iranian declaration of possession or use of nuclear weapons. It is possible, Khamenei is seeing the continued pursuit of nuclear weapons as being not worth the effort.

Furthermore, Iran seeks to end its isolation. In the response to Syria's use of chemical weapons, Russia presented a diplomatic solution rather than a military solution that resulted in Syria turning over its chemical weapon stockpiles to international actors. This indicates that Russia seems to be more influential in Middle Eastern affairs than Iran. It is somewhat damaging to Iran's desire to be a regional power if non-Muslim foreign states are solving crises in its own backyard.

Iran offering an olive branch to the United States is not one that should be ignored. To do so casts the United States as unwilling to speak with other states, especially after being rebuked internationally by attempting to spearhead another military campaign in another Muslim state. Further discussions, initially innocuous, will further plant the seeds of potential trust.

In a world where even a handshake in a hallway is politically dangerous, the initial steps must be carefully choreographed and both sides need a domestic out, should either become nervous or feel threatened. Upon returning to Tehran, protestors reportedly threw shoes at Rouhani, a grave insult in Islamic cultures. This indicates that not everyone is entirely on board with the potential of relations. It seems that many anti-Iranian elements in the United States are temporarily distracted by the impending government shutdown and that addressing the Iran issue at this time would divide attention from their domestic agenda.

Continuing forward, Iran has made the first steps in opening communication and normalizing relations. The United States is obligated, unofficially of course, to respond publicly with a counter offer. Refusing to engage now would set back relations with Iran for decades but how to proceed and at what speed remain up for debate.

First, we must determine if Iran's olive branch is legitimate and sincere. Rouhani seems to have the support of Khamenei and, thus far, has avoided any official condemnation of his actions by Khamenei. It seems to have passed the legitimacy test for now. Sincerity is difficult to determine. Unfortunately, sincerity would take time to judge and the United States would be wise to approach cautiously but optimistically, keeping disengagement options available.

The United States has many reasons to find normalizing relations productive. First, as other traditional dictatorships fall, Iran is making a bid to be a regional power. Certain responsibilities accompany this territory, specifically renouncing ties to terror groups and being forward and honest about nuclear ambitions. Both outcomes are beneficial to the United States.

Additionally, the open relations allows the United States access to certain strata in Iranian society, particularly the Green Movement individuals who protested in 2009 ahead of a government crackdown. It also opens Iran to American business and American markets which forces Iran to at least play in the more familiar ground of American capitalism. American businesses would take root in Iran and offer more potential inroads for American policy and influence in Iranian society and government.

Furthermore, it brings an enemy closer. It is much easier for American intelligence agencies to keep a closer eye on Iran and its agenda if relations between the two countries were more normal. American refusals to associate with North Korea has resulted in American intelligence agencies to be unsure exactly of Kim Jong-Un's age. The level of information flowing between the countries only improves the United States' ability to observe and analyze emerging trends and agendas.

The major issue, of course, is Israel. Iran, if it indeed intends to become a regional power, needs to behave like one, which means encouraging stability. Bellicose rhetoric directed at Israel or any nation does not result in international confidence in Iran's ability to be a leader. Israel, on the other hand, likely considers any contact between the United States and Iran that results in normalizing relations negatively. Israel wants, and expects, absolute American support, including supporting its foreign policy towards Iran. This doesn't mean that normalizing relations between Israel and Iran is impossible, even Khamenei indicated he would not close off relations with any nation forever and he did not immediately exclude Israel either.

Perhaps then, the best response the United States can offer is one Rouhani is familiar with: prudence and hope. American policymakers should be aware that Iran does indeed have an agenda, and though Rouhani's words are encouraging, it will take time for trust to develop between Obama and Rouhani, both of whom will be partially constrained by the interests of domestic actors. The initial steps must be small and cautious and all countries involved must have an escape route, should the situation return to the status quo. If those conditions can be met, then both nations have an opportunity to reinvigorate relations and possibly bring about some hope for stability in the Middle East.