A Change in Strategy

A Change in Strategy

Introduction

The recent attack in Kenya, though alarming and attracting considerable attention from American and World news networks, is not surprising. The most recent reports indicate nearly seventy people killed, and another thirty held hostage by an estimated dozen gunmen and possibly, gunwoman. Additionally, it would appear as though at least some of the gunmen are Americans and Europeans. Al Shabab, a designated terrorist group from Somalia has claimed responsibility, going so far as to releasing the names of the gunmen along with regular updates on its Twitter feed.

Kenya, a predominantly Christian nation set aside the predominantly Muslim Somalia, has been deeply concerned about the possibility of spillover violence in the aftermath of the Somali civil war and resulting instability. In 2011, Kenya, supporting the Somali military, drove al Shabab from its last stronghold in Kismayo. However, Kenya was hardly the first example of foreign intervention in Somalia, though it is the most recent. Much of al Shabab's agenda stems from resistance to armed intervention in the country and what it deems as Christian crusading and it has responded with revenge attacks.

Before we can understand the situation in Kenya, we must have some background an al Shabab and their motivations.

Background

Contrary to popular belief, al Qaida did not have a considerable foothold in Somalia either during the civil war or the Black Hawk Down firefight. Although there is evidence that al Qaida may have been involved with some training of the militias in Mogadishu, none could certainly be considered al Qaida affiliated. Certainly the network was looking for ways to enter the East African region but the constant civil war and oppressive rule by mostly secular warlords did not give al Qaida the sort of market they needed for recruits or resources. Conflicts there were largely tribal in nature and were limited in scope to the national level. The concept of global jihad was not one warlords or tribal leaders were concerned with when chaos reigned at home.

That would soon change. Even after the United States withdrew special operations forces after the perceived disaster in Mogadishu in which deceased American operators were mutilated and dragged through the streets, the CIA was still involved in the conflict. Of particular interest was Mohamed Afrah Qanyare, one of the most powerful warlords to emerge after the fall of Mohammed Diad Barre's government. The CIA partnered with him and others hunting for high value targets in Somalia with the understanding that it would be Qanyare's fighters, rather than American operators, who would do the actual takedowns. However, Qanyare's fighters ended up targeting civilians including imams and teachers which infuriated local tribes.

Those local tribes, disgusted with the loss of life, particularly the deaths of Muslims at the hands of warlords, banded together in an organization called the Islamic Courts Union. This was a loose federation of local groups interested in ending the fighting and establishing Sharia law in the country. Ultimately, Qanyare and his allies lost ground to the ICU and its collection of fighters. Harakat al Shabab al Mujahideen was one of the small groups that joined the ICU to fight Qanyare.

The exact date of al Shabab's formation seems in dispute. However, it is generally accepted that its founders were active in militant Islam in the years after the U.S. Embassy bombings in Africa but did not coalesce into a functional group until 2003, after the U.S. Invasion of Iraq. Al Shabab is Arabic for “The Youth” and much of its early history involved training young men for jihad. It was led by veteran jihadists Aden Hashi Farah Ayro and later by Ahmed Abdi Godane.

The group did not really become loosely affiliated with al Qaida until 2004 when it was joined by Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, long believed to be the mastermind behind the 1998 embassy bombings. In al Shabab, al Qaida saw a way to gain entrance into East Africa. Such relations with al Qaida were not publicly formalized until February 2012, after the death of Osama bin Laden who had feared such public confirmation would damage al Shabab's recruitment and fund raising.

As the ICU continued to push out Qanyare, it established a new government in Mogadishu under the leadership of Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. This loss did not sit well with the United States, and immediately the CIA began negotiating with Ethiopian authorities to launch an invasion in order to push out the ICU and establish the more familiar government under Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi. Ethiopia, fearing spillover violence and desiring revenge for a brutal war between the two nations in the 1970s, was eager to comply.

It was during this time that al Shabab's influence began to increase. The CIA was worried about al Shabab's militant, Islamic leanings and funded means to destroy them. The more the CIA funded those means, the more al Shabab and the ICU grew in power. The frameworks they had adopted from al Qaida influences painting the United States, Ethiopia and other nations as Christian crusaders seemed to be coming true. First American backed warlords and now American funded and supported invasions seemed to be the norm. Al Shabab retreated under the invasion, but was not finished.

The group took in tens of millions of dollars annually via its control over ports, shipping and drug and weapons smuggling. The American support of warlords and invasions fueled and inadvertently led to the development of al Shabab by supplying recruits with reasons to fight. Al Shabab took on the goal of defending Muslim land from foreign aggression, much as Mujahedin forces had in Afghanistan against the Soviets, then the Americans.

In 2011, the United States similarly supported and trained Kenyan forces which launched multiple attacks against al Shabab seeking to establish a buffer zone and prevent incursions into Kenya. Nairobi had already been the target of the bombings in 1998 which succeeded in killing nearly 200 Kenyans. Additional attacks targeted African Union facilities and Kenyan government posts.

An attack on Kenya, and on Westerners and Christians in particular, seemed to be coming. Although Kenyan authorities claim to have disrupted other plots in the past, the change in tactics and personnel might offer a reason as to why this operation was not foiled.

Recruiting Westerners

Al Shabab is unique among Islamic militant groups. A report by the House Committee on Homeland Security suggested that more Americans have ended up fighting with them than any other group. One of the first was Omar Hammami, a college student from Alabama who converted to Islam in high school and was determined to join the jihad. Hammami, also called Abu Mansor al-Amriki, was used extensively in recruiting videos and internet postings. Al Shabab also seems to be very adept at using technology to reach its target audiences which may explain its success in recruiting foreigners, especially Westerners. The group's Twitter account also seemed to be giving regular updates during the attack on the mall in Kenya.

The House Committee report also suggests at least forty Americans have joined al Shabab, over half from a Somali community in Minnesota. An FBI report from 2007 suggests that at least seven have been killed and more recent reports indicate as many as fifteen, half of whom were suicide bombers. Omar Hammami himself was reportedly killed by al Shabab after a disagreement in policy and subsequent falling out.

Reports that some of the gunmen, including possibly a gunwoman, are “white” suggest al Shabab is sending a message announcing it is intending to be more of a global player despite its reduced capabilities. In fact, it seems the vast majority of the gunmen seem to be foreigners from Western states.

The Westgate Attack

According to officials, between ten and fifteen armed gunmen, and by some accounts, gunwoman, stormed the Westgate Mall, hunting non-Muslims with a particular interest in Westerners. The attackers carefully ensured Muslims would not by harmed, apparently by asking individuals the name of Mohammad's mother. Those who identified her correctly were escorted from the building, those who failed were shot.

Evidently, the gunmen were following a stricter “rules of engagement” set forth by Ayman al Zawahiri who has taken control of al Qaida and ostensibly the global network of affiliates including al Shabab after the death of bin Laden. Zawahiri indicated attacks should only be carried out against Western or pro-Western governments not against Muslim states. Hostages were encouraged to be traded for captured militants, and that gunmen should limit or prevent the killings of innocent Muslims. Zawahiri had also evidently warned al Shabab several years ago against continued attacks in Mogadishu that resulted in the deaths of Muslims. This suggests that perhaps al Qaida's image has been damaged due to its use of force against Muslim civilians. It is also possible the recent Arab Spring movement, and civil wars in Libya and Syria and ongoing violence in Egypt that have pitted Muslims against each other may factor in to Zawahiri's thinking. It may be an effort on the part of Zawahiri to refocus militant groups on fighting the West rather than each other.

The Westgate attack is bold, considering that the majority of al Shabab's attacks in the past have been bombings, including the bombing at the Ugandan capital of Kampala that killed nearly seventy people watching the World Cup. Other suicide bombings have become al Shabab's calling card. Thus, sending a dozen gunmen into a mall without a clear exit plan is a deviation from the norm, suggesting a return in thinking to the Mumbai attacks of 2008 executed by the group Lashkar-e-Taiba. That attack resulted in the deaths of 166 people and nine of the ten gunmen. A change in tactics to the Mumbai style suggests a more organized, committed, and trained al Shabab, who look for quality, intelligent recruits, rather than simple suicide bombers.

The situation in the mall is ongoing, so no concrete conclusions can yet be made. Reports indicate that most of the hostages have been freed and that Kenyan authorities are largely operating on their own, although there is some indication that American and Israeli officials and support staff are on site.

Indicators

The attack is significant, of course, in terms of its audacity and the number of people killed. However, there are some important indicators. The fact that the gunmen went through such trouble separating out Muslims from intended targets suggests some sort of adjustment to a “rules of engagement.” Bombs are, inherently, indiscriminate, and the use of informed and capable gunmen carrying out those rules indicates a change in strategy.

It is possible that increased violence in the Muslim world has necessitated a change in approach for al Qaida and its affiliates. Indiscriminate killings of Muslims seemed to be tolerated and in some cases even encouraged by al Qaida operations, mainly via the use of suicide bombings executed by recruit recruits and converts. It suggests the civil wars in Libya, and Syria and the political violence in Egypt has taken its toll on the militant psyche. They would allege that Muslims have become distracted by secular wars against each other, when they should be united in jihad against the West. A change in strategy that prevented Muslim fatalities could be a means of encouraging Muslims to cease internal conflicts. It suggests that perhaps the fighting in Syria, including the use of gas against Muslim civilians has al Qaida concerned and looking to regain control of the situation.

Furthermore, the use of Western raised and education personnel, rather than exclusively locally recruited fighters suggests a change in thinking. Al Shabab has made no secret of its success at recruiting foreigners and the use of them as ground fighters suggests that this attack may be a test run for future plots. Using fighters with ethnic backgrounds not typical of the average al Shabab member may make it easier for them to infiltrate foreign areas more easily. Dressing and speaking as natives in the United States or Europe makes al Shabab members harder to detect.

The availability of technology to al Shabab is also worthy of consideration. Their use of internet sources, including Twitter, make recruiting of individuals in high technology areas much easier. The dissemination of information and material is simple across those sources. The Twitter account used by al Shabab was active throughout the Westgate attack until shut down by the company. Considering Somalia is one of the poorest nations on Earth and has one of the lowest percentages of its population capable of accessing the internet, al Shabab's reliance on it is interesting. It suggests foreign help.

Policy Considerations

Naturally American media and local policy agencies will worry about the security of American malls. In recent mass shootings, lone gunmen have been able to kill a dozen or more individuals in high population, low security areas such as movie theaters and schools. A dozen trained and well armed shooters could cause considerable damage.

Any attack requires resources: committed, trained and discipline personnel, access to weapons, and evasion of security. Reports from Westgate indicate at least eight of the gunmen are from Western countries. Their knowledge of American malls and American upbringing may make them ideal personnel to carry out similar attacks. Firearms in the United States are easy to obtain. Background checks routinely fail to detect those with mental illness and stealing weapons or purchasing them from a black market is not difficult.

Well known militants can be caught by INS and other homeland security agencies, therefore sending recruits from Somali or other hotspots becomes more difficult. Recruiting locally allows groups like al Shabab to bypass traditional security methods and having personnel in place without needing to send them from abroad. Al Shabab has proven very effective at this.

Considering al Shabab's primary recruiting methods are technological, this becomes a greater issue for cyber defense and local authorities. Message boards, websites and social media are often used as recruiting tools and monitoring those media are obvious means of preventing radicalization and recruitment.

Additionally, human intelligence is often the best defense. Inroads to the Somali communities, particularly in Minnesota, and local Islamic leaders can result in improve communication. American Muslims should be made to feel confident and safe when contacting local authorities with tips or concerns.

Of course, governments are not always successful in preventing terrorism. In those cases, the American public and first responders end up being the last line of defense. Many plots have been foiled, not by the CIA or military personnel, but by average citizens who were observant and responsive. A well informed citizenry, and a well trained and coordinated local response may very well be the most effective method of preventing these sorts of attacks.